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The 11th Ministerial Conference of the WTO saw the coming together of 121
WTO members to support the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women’s
Economic Empowerment (hereinafter ‘Gender Declaration’). Members went on to
endorse a liberal feminist strategy to promote gender equality within the international
trading system. Pursuant to the Gender Declaration, the WTO has convened a
series of conferences and workshops to deliberate upon ways to promote women’s
participation in international trade. The underlying objective of this exercise is to
integrate more women into the neo-liberal globalization process.
However, the jury is still out on the ills and benefits of neo-liberalism; and herein
lies the inherent limitation in the liberal feminist approach. Socialist feminists hold
that the deeper roots of women’s oppression – especially, women in the Global
South – can be traced to the neo-liberal economic order itself. However, the liberal
feminist approach extends no such critique of the global political economy. Much to
the contrary, as Nancy Fraser notes, gender equality is but a smokescreen through
which the liberal feminist discourse fosters the neo-liberal project (on socialist
feminism generally, see here and here).
This is quite a fitting critique of the Gender Declaration as well, which seeks entry
into the neo-liberal trading system, without interrogating the systemic inequalities
that it perpetuates. Consequently, the Gender Declaration, at most, offers a partial
analysis of the problem: one that is primarily oriented towards the privileged position
of white, middle-class women, but inattentive to the economic exploitation of women
in the Global South.
Proponents of the Gender Declaration would argue that by promoting access
to finance and female entrepreneurship – in areas such as public procurement,
value chains and trade facilitation – the liberal feminist approach does address
the distinctive concerns of third world women. This contribution, however, argues
that such piecemeal measures would not be sufficient. A pertinent point of inquiry,
conspicuously missing from the declaration, is the gendered impact of traditional
trade issues such as agriculture, informal work of women in export industries, access
to medicines and services. Rather than addressing such systemic concerns, the
Gender Declaration serves the broader agenda of liberalizing the digital economy
and public procurement markets – with profound repercussions for women in
developing countries (see here, here and here).
Against this backdrop, this contribution demonstrates how the approach articulated
by post-colonial and socialist feminists is more apt insofar as it studies the impact of
trade liberalisation on third world women, in conjunction with its effects across class,
- 1 -
race, caste and sexual orientation (for an exposition of the post-colonial materialist
feminist theory, see here and here).
The missing agenda
Gender-mainstreaming within the existing trading system has been insistently
resisted by networks of feminist economists like the International Working Group
on Gender, Macroeconomics and International Economics (GEM-IWG) and
International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN). Their principal contention is that
economically privileged women stand to gain the most from trade liberalization, while
women on the periphery of the economic system are further marginalized. They
validate their postulation through empirical studies across various WTO covered
agreements: illustrating how trade liberalisation broadens the class divide, with all
the more deleterious consequences for disadvantaged women, especially in the
Global South (see here for recent work in this area).
Case in point is the inherently inequitable Agreement on Agriculture, and the
ever proliferating Free Trade Agreements. Due to the liberalization of agricultural
markets, small farmers in developing countries are outcompeted by the influx of
imported agricultural goods. Their plight is exacerbated by the State’s commitment
to eliminate domestic agricultural subsidies. Resultantly, developing countries
find themselves confounded by concerns of food security and large-scale farmer
displacement. This has an indelible impact on the lives of women, who are amongst
the most marginalized constituencies in the agricultural sector. Women are largely
involved in informal agricultural activities, with minimal access to productive
resources like land, credit and water. They are, therefore, amongst the hardest hit by
the liberalization of agricultural markets.
The predicament of women in export led industries, such as manufacturing and
textiles, is also telling. The emergence of global value chains (GVCs) has led
to a substantial feminization of labour in developing countries. While this is a
commendable development, it has come on the heels of gender-based wage
disparities and exploitative working conditions for women in the informal sector.
Thus, from a Marxist perspective, the advent of GVCs can be said to have created
a ‘global reserve army of labour’. Studies indicate that the inclusion of labour
standards within trade agreements is not a credible solution to this problem, on
account of its protectionist character (see here and here). Thus, we need to rethink
policy-options for alleviating women’s oppression in the hands of GVCs.
Another area that exemplifies this conundrum is the opening of trade in services,
which has typically benefitted qualified professionals, with no gains in sight
for unskilled labour. For instance, labour migration (Mode IV) has been made
permissible only for skilled personnel, and therefore, does not serve the interests of
women care givers from developing countries. Likewise, the ‘cross-border supply
of services’ (Mode I) has resulted in marked prosperity, but only for skilled IT
technicians. One may also consider the liberalization of ‘consumption abroad’ (Mode
II), which despite its advantages for medical professionals, has been accompanied
by issues of sex tourism and surrogacy that afflict the more disadvantaged female
population. Another matter of grave concern is the deregulation of FDI in services
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(Mode III), which could threaten access to critical services like healthcare, education,
water and banking, with severe implications for women on the fringes of the
economic system.
The foregoing discussion is incomplete without a mention of the TRIPS-plus regime
– a characteristic of North-South FTAs – which has strengthened patent protection,
while attenuating the already meagre space for policy manoeuvre that developing
countries have under TRIPS. Medicine prices have been on an upward spiral since
the coming into force of TRIPS-plus obligations like data exclusivity, patent term
extension, and patent linkage, among others. The plight of women is differentially
exaggerated by developments of this nature, on account of their deplorable access
to healthcare and medicine.
Strikingly, the above studies have not influenced the agenda of the Gender
Declaration. Ideally speaking, the Gender Declaration should have tested the validity
of the aforementioned claims in light of recent empirical evidence. Not only does
the Declaration disregard these concerns, it instead focuses attention on areas
that propose further trade liberalization and have long been resisted by developing
countries for their asymmetrical character. In essence, thus, the WTO unequivocally
exhibits its bias towards the neo-liberal philosophy.
The Declaration’s biased agenda
The above claim may be validated, for example, by the Declaration’s emphasis
on enhancing female entrepreneurship in public procurement markets. With the
purported objective of gender equality, the Declaration makes a case for public
procurement market access – which would disable developing country governments
from preferentially treating their domestic enterprises, and consequentially, impede
their socio-economic development.
The Gender Declaration also seeks to bring through the backdoor the contentious
issue of trade facilitation. By purveying the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)
as a promoter of female economic empowerment, the Declaration glosses over
the significant financial costs involved in its implementation, that developing
countries would have to apportion out of their national budgets. Moreover, the TFA
while facilitating imports into developing countries, offers nothing to expand their
productive and export capacities, and may therefore usher in a situation of trade
imbalance. In the foregoing context, ‘The false promise of Aid for Trade’ cannot be
accented enough.
Another seemingly benevolent objective of the Gender Declaration is the promotion
of female entrepreneurship in Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
integrated within GVCs. MSMEs, unarguably, provide employment to large sections
of the female population in developing countries. However, the WTO’s newfound
interest in the promotion of MSMEs (see also the Joint Ministerial Statement on
MSMEs, 2017) is possibly part of a bigger strategy to negotiate a binding agreement
on the liberalization of e-commerce (see here). The standard argument of developed
countries is that the liberalization of e-commerce would increase the market access
of MSMEs. This argument, however, is unconvincing. The MSMEs located in
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developing countries do not have adequate access to digital infrastructure, and
would in all probability be driven out of the highly competitive digital markets. In
effect, therefore, the strategy to promote MSMEs through the liberalization of e-
commerce is highly counter-intuitive.
In conclusion
This piece is an attempt at highlighting how gender mainstreaming within the neo-
liberal trading system can never address the concerns of the female subaltern. What
is required, instead, is an appraisal of how trade liberalization affects women in the
Global South, who are splintered along the lines of class, race and caste.
Given this context, it is concluded that the WTO must reform its approach to gender,
if at all it is to meaningfully impact the lives of women. And no amount of window-
dressing would help the cause.
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